Pole Position

The balance of Europe is shifting Eastwards

The last week has thrown the future of relations between the US and Europe into sharp relief. The new American administration has confirmed the worst suspicions of many in Europe. The US now seems, at best, apathetic and, at worst, openly hostile to European interests. NATO looks on shaky ground, and the constancy of post-war security arrangements is now in flux. It has also shown the changing balance of power, influence and interest within Europe. As the US steps back from being the security guarantor of the continent, Europeans must consider how internal power will evolve as they try to meet the challenge.

Where once "Europe" meant Franco-German leadership, the dynamic is changing. The centre of Europe is moving eastwards. The economic power of the former Warsaw Pact countries is increasing, as is their political and cultural heft. This will change both how power on the continent operates and what it is concerned with. As America pushes Europe to become more self-sufficient and self-interested, this fluctuation within Europe will be important. The transition as Central and Eastern Europe comes of age could cause tension in the old alliances and become as much of a challenge as it is an opportunity for the continent.

The very terms Eastern and Western Europe point towards the historic division of the continent. This schism was very real during the Cold War, with the continent divided between NATO and her allies (largely liberal democracies, entirely so after Spain and Portugal shed their dictatorships) and the Warsaw Pact countries to the East. This, however, confirmed longer-standing cultural divisions, as Britain, Germany and France were often forerunners in industrial and political developments. Europe east of the Oder was far away, impoverished and largely ignored. You'd struggle to find mention of it in much of English history before the 20^th century.

These historical divisions entrenched economic and political disparities, but with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe began its journey of reintegration and renewal—albeit with lingering stereotypes and inequalities. When the wall came down, now 35 years ago, it was the start of a slow realignment. The countries of Eastern Europe edged towards democracy and prosperity. Accession to the EU was a major part of this, with an organisation that was forged in France, Germany, and the Benelux countries welcoming a swathe of new peoples and places. Yet the cultural grasp of this lagged behind. Those countries that joined in 2004 were still much poorer than the EU average and stereotyped for their history and position.

It was around this period when I started visiting Eastern Europe. My father had tired of the Mediterranean and wanted to explore nations he'd eschewed on ideological grounds when they were behind the Iron Curtain. Even once in the EU, they were mostly seen as "weird" places to go. People you told about it tended to think of them as barren places of grim-post Soviet apartments and stodgy food. Despite their proximity, they remained, in the academic parlance, "othered" – seen as apart from, and inferior to, the more prosperous Western bits of Europe. Another twenty or so years on, this balance has shifted, and it will have real ramifications for the continent.

Those countries of Central and Eastern Europe have seized upon the opportunities of economic liberalism and integration with the rest of the continent. They have climbed the ranks in terms of economic and social performance. GDP has risen dramatically. Most of the A10 countries have overtaken Portugal and Greece, the laggards of Old Europe, in GDP per capita. Poland will soon be as rich per person as Spain, while the most aggressive projections see it overtaking Britain in a decade or so. Health and life expectancy have surged in these countries. Estonia has become the hub of digital citizenship, with forward-thinking approaches to ID and government services, and the birthplace of leading tech companies.

In most of these countries, EU funds have been deployed well. Investment in infrastructure has led to economic booms. Countries like Czechia have positioned themselves as manufacturing hubs. Post-COVID, they have seized on the trend for near-shoring in both goods and services. Rather than the labourers that moved across with the opening up of free movement, a new generation of Eastern European tech workers have come of age, economically and culturally enmeshed with Western Europe.

The Central and Eastern states look less and less like the poorer partners as each year goes by. This gives them potency and influence. Poland, in particular, which has not just wealth but size (with a population of just below 40 million), is going to be rich in absolute as well as per capita terms. It always has the EU's fourth largest army, and recent increases in defence spending will ensure that it is well equipped. This hard power will be a new and increasingly important factor in European dynamics.

The interests of Eastern Europe are set to become more important within the EU. Already, these states are taking a lead on defence and security. Their fear of Russia has obvious and real causes, and the war in Ukraine has galvanised them. Most have been hawkish, spending significant amounts on their own and Ukraine's defence. They have gained diplomatic sway, too, with Estonian Kaja Kallas, a hawkish advocate for standing up to Russia, now Vice-President of the European Commission and well-regarded in European circles. She is likely to be part of a new vanguard of influential figures from the East of the bloc.

There are potential tensions here. As the Central and Eastern European nations gain power and wealth, they may disrupt some of the existing balances with the EU. They will want more say but could also start to bridle at longstanding EU approaches. Changing the balance between contributors and receivers of EU money could prove tricky. When Poland is richer than nations like Spain, it may rankle at how EU funds are sent there.

Other subjects could prove tricky, too. A still-growing Central and Eastern Europe, with more manufacturing and less advanced agriculture, could act as a break in German-led environmentalism. Even more controversial could be refugee politics, where Eastern European leaders have again already proven more hawkish than those in the West. The liberalism of Germany, in particular, is unpopular there, and the issue is a particular flash point for Poland along the Belarusian border. An increasingly confident Central and Eastern European bloc could help drive Europe rightwards on the issue.

There are cultural divisions here, too. The newer members of the EU perhaps have different visions of the EU than some of the old guard. They have stressed national sovereignty at times, and while supporters of expansion, are likely to serve as a brake on EU integration and federalism. They also tend to be more socially conservative, with few offering formal recognition of same-sex partnerships and only Slovenia legislating for gay marriage. This could cause further rifts around the social integration of the EU.

Of course, there are further internal tensions within Central and Eastern Europe. It is far from a monolith. The counterweight to Baltic hawkishness on Russia has been Orban in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Fico in Slovakia. The former has presented a particular problem for the EU already – happy to take the money the EU proffers but reluctant to align with many of its interests and ideals. There are other similar populist movements in many parts of the East (and let's not forget that the AfD is strongest in what was the DDR). The ambivalence on Russian aggression and reluctance to follow democratic norms is providing a further challenges to the EU.

All of this could be further developed by future EU expansion. There is nothing to expand to in the West, meaning the future geography of the Union will have to spread Eastwards, pulling in more countries like those who joined in 2004. The rest of the Balkan nations are edging towards membership. More complex questions lie around the Caucasus. And then there is, of course, Ukraine itself. The country aspires to membership and hopes, post-war, to enjoy the same trajectory as Poland. If permitted to join and be successful in recovery, the nation will also be a major player in the bloc, with a population of 40 million and significant amounts of Europe's farming land.

The success of Central and Eastern Europe over the last thirty or so years has been hugely encouraging. These countries have emerged from Soviet influence (or indeed conquest) and largely charted a course of increasing prosperity and freedom. Far from being the "weird" fringes of Europe, they are now an integral part of it. Economically, they are catching up with most of the Western nations. Diplomatically, they have come into their own during the response to Ukraine. On a more cultural level, the availability of cheap flights and warm welcomes has made them very familiar now to millions of Europeans. Just as they have been changed by accession and integration, they now look set to change it.

In the coming decade or so, Europe will be increasingly influenced by its East. These countries will be richer and, as a result, demand more of a say. Their talented politicians will make their mark in the institutions, while their national delegations will also want to shape them. This could dilute the historic power of France and Germany and squeeze out some of the Western nations that have failed to maintain the same levels of success. With security to Europe's East increasingly on the agenda, they could be set to take centre stage.

For Britain, this presents an opportunity. Now, outside the EU bloc, our relations with those in it are vital. Alignment over Ukraine and mutual respect with many of the Eastern European nations could foster something. Played well, the rise of nations like Poland could help our interests as the bloc moves past Franco-German dominance. The shifting tides of European power are something we now need to be more aligned with, and this means paying the East more attention.

Overall, it is worth observing how these dynamics are shifting. Where once Eastern Europe felt like a backwater, it is now a powerhouse. We have already seen the first stirrings of this with the war in Ukraine. As these nations become richer and more confident, the trend is set to continue, compounded by Europe's increased importance. Those who want to be attuned to power on the continent should take notice.

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