From Ally to Agitator?

The risks exposed in the US's new National Security Strategy

“…until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old.”

Churchill’s “We shall fight on the beaches” address is perhaps the most famous peroration in British politics. It is also often misunderstood. With the triumphalist hindsight of the post-war period, it became symbolic of plucky Britain’s determination to win out. Yet the actual words show far less confidence. The most famous section describes not victory, but a defiant retreat. You only fight on the landing grounds if you have lost on the beaches, in the hills, only when you have been driven from defeat. The final line, quoted above, carries a tone that is anything but triumphant.

Though Britain may fight alone through the darkest days, victory, it posits, is only possible if the United States wakes up and enters the war. Now, Churchill believed this would happen and, in part, advocated that she do so. But he was also admitting the new reality of the world: the European Empires, and most of all the British ones, were a spent force. The US had become the world’s superpower, and Europe was now dependent on it. America would be more prosperous, stronger and ultimately dominant.

He was not wrong. US materiel and manpower proved essential for winning the war in Western Europe. They shouldered the most significant burden of the war in Asia and developed the nuclear bomb, which ended it. In the post-war world, Europe would rely on the United States for both economic rebuilding and security. As the Cold War developed, the extent of this relationship became clear. European security became increasingly dependent on American men, technology, and taxpayers.