Deferral Nation

Britain's defence problem is a political will problem

So first off, a little announcement:
At the end of July, I will be driving to Ukraine. I’ll be part of a convoy delivering vehicles for medical evacuations at the front line. I’ll be driving across Europe, from the UK to Lviv.

I’m currently fundraising for the trip - aiming to raise £7,000. This money will purchase the vehicle, fund modifications, and the costs of getting it there. Any surplus will fund other equipment, like drone detectors and medical equipment.

Any support his hugely appreciated and will make a difference. You can donate here.

Thank you!

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John Healey’s resignation yesterday was a shock but not a surprise. The Defence Investment Plan is long overdue. It was easy to infer that the delay was the result of tussles between the MOD and the Treasury over how much money would be found, where it would come from, and when it would appear. It was also likely that Keir Starmer would defer to Reeves on the Fiscal Rules and the tax pledges, leaving the Defence Secretary in an untenable position. In many ways, it is the Starmer government in microcosm – tied up in its own mistakes, unable to deliver on its own promises.

It is not simply this government’s failure, however. The same issue occurred under the Conservatives and will probably haunt the next PM too. Quite simply, Britain has a political will problem when it comes to funding defence. All governments are aware of the issues. They see the worrying trend in world events, and they understand the importance of defence and deterrence. Politically, however, they are reluctant to prioritise it.

Ever since the war in Ukraine began, it has been starkly clear that Britain needs to adapt to a new defence landscape. There is a real possibility of a widening conflict in Europe. Developing our military is a vital part of deterring it and is essential preparation for if we ever have to fight it. None of that happens without money or a clearly communicated strategy that provides direction for defence companies and investors. Politicians have reacted to this with promises, but have failed to convert them into a plan. Increased spending has been kicked off into the middle distance, as the gap between our aspirations and ability grows.

There is a grim political reality to this. Defence is a relatively low priority for voters. It falls even lower when it is in direct competition with something more urgent and obviously apparent. Spending on defence this year delivers few direct, tangible impacts. Indeed, arguably the best defence spending, which serves as a deterrent, goes unused. While it may be popular in the abstract, defence spending loses out in head-to-heads with other priorities, whether that is health or keeping taxes down.

An effective strategy in anything requires choosing what to do and what not to do. Prioritisation is an action, not a statement. It means undertaking the necessary trade-offs and bearing the costs to achieve what you want. Successive UK governments have quite simply prioritised other things, often driven by short-term electoral incentives. Ministers like defence announcements and photo ops. They do not like picking up the bill or deciding where the money will come from. The result is what we have seen for the last half-decade: incremental changes and the big jumps deferred until later in the timetable.

There is little political punishment for this. Few votes are swayed by the state of the armed forces, our security or defence readiness. Other things matter more in the short term. This makes a particularly counterproductive dynamic. Investment in defence should compound. Actions taken today ought to be allowed to mature, creating a base you can develop from should a crisis escalate. Instead, Britain is deferring investment into the future, where it remains vulnerable to cuts and is less likely to deliver lasting returns.

Failing to resolve this political question leads us to ignore an even bigger strategic one around what we actually want from the MOD. The country has long nursed various pretensions about the level of power it ought to be able to protect. There are aspirations to be a Tier 1 military power. There is a very strong case for remaining a nuclear state. We are an island nation with an obvious interest in maintaining maritime power. We also aspire to be a serious European land force. With enough funding, we would probably be able to maintain all those ambitions. Yet we are as reluctant to abandon any of them as we are to properly spend on achieving them.

Instead of actively choosing a course, Britain has defaulted on all those commitments. By deferring hard decisions, we have ended up implicitly salami-slicing everything. Across domains, we are plagued by long-term procurement problems, ongoing mechanical issues and shortfalls. Our deployable division (25,000 troops) is largely illusory, lacking both the manpower and the logistics to back it up. The Marines can’t deploy proper amphibious and littoral strike capabilities. The list goes on, with most of these shortfalls the result of failing to decide how things should be replaced or refitted, rather than consciously committing to what we think our capabilities need to be.

The rise of global risks has exposed the pitfalls of this. Britain must face up to a real risk of war in Europe, as well as deteriorating global security. The time for a defence strategy padded out with hopes, prayers and good intentions is over. There needs to be a real national discussion about what we are prepared to afford and what we think it should buy us. We have to consider our role, our commitments, and what technology and personnel levels deliver it. These should be rooted in strategic decisions, not simply the maths and budget balancing of the Treasury. Most of all, it requires honesty about resource allocations and the political choices the country can make.

These decisions are further complicated by Britain’s being unmoored between Europe and the USA. The less willing we are to fund full-spectrum defence ourselves, the more we will have to specialise and the more reliant we become on allies. Our ambiguity was historically covered by American largesse. Now that seems seriously imperilled. The US is at best weak in its commitments to European security. MAGA seems actively hostile to us, more focused on arguments about migration than the threats we anticipate from Russia. Even after Trump is gone, it is unclear whether America will continue in an isolationist trend. The self-inflicted wound of Brexit has worsened things in the other direction, pushing us away from many European structures and conversations.

None of this gets resolved without a political class that shows some will. The public understands, on some level, the extent of the threat. They see what is happening in Ukraine and remain supportive of our ally there. People also see the fallout from Hormuz, how it hits their expenses, and understand some of the costs of insecurity. But politicians fail to take the argument further, to challenge Treasury thinking, to explain the trade-offs, and to advocate for paying them. This requires a sustained strategic seriousness that so far, we have lacked.

Healey was honour-bound to leave the government at this latest impasse. That doesn’t, however, mean that doing so will force the reckoning that is needed. Starmer is unlikely to change his mind now and will probably be replaced soon anyway. There is little sign that any successor will break free from the same political calculus that has mired our strategic thinking over the past decade or more. Whatever our approach is, it requires making decisions and sticking to them, not mere declarations of intent. Rising instability is already here, and we are not ready.